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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between technological change
and inequality in the U.S. since the late 1960's. The analysis focuses
primarily on studying patterns and trends in the dispersion of various
distributions of earnings and income during this recent period of rapid
technological progress. We review relevant literature and perform several
empirical analyses using microdata from the March Current Population Surveys
from 1968 to 1986. Our main findings are that there is little empirical
evidence that earnings inequality, measured across individual workers,
has increased since the late 1960's, and even less evidence to support the
hypothesis that any changes that have occurred have resulted from the effect
of technological change on the demand for labor. However, we do find
evidence of an increase since the late 1960's in the inequality of total
family income, measured across families. Moreover, much of the increase
appears to be due to changes in family composition and labor supply
behavior, suggesting that the main effects of recent technological change
on inequality have been supply-side in nature.
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Although technological progress has always been an important feature of
the American economy, the introduction and diffusion of new technologies has
proceeded at an especially rapid pace during the past two decades.
Production technologies are being powerfully affected by the development of
microprocessors and microcomputers, automated production processes, lasers
and satellite communications equipment, and data handling and information
systems. These and other changes are fundamentally transforming the nature
of traditional workplaces, as well as leading to the emergence of new work
environments. Important academic and policy issues relating to the impact
of technological progress on employment and unemployment, on labor
productivity, and on earnings levels are being raised as a by-product of the
changing nature of work. The impact of recent technological changes on the
distribution of income has also been the focus of much recent discussion.
In his Presidential Address to the American Economic Association in
1954, Simon Kuznets set out what has become a classic analysis of the
relationship between technological change and the distribution of income.
Historically, according to Kuznets, technological change promoted industrial
growth, which lead to an increase in labor demand in the industrial sector
and a corresponding increase in the ratio of wages in industrial employment
to wages in agricultural employment. Rising industrial wages induced a flow
of workers from the low-wage agricultural sector to the high-wage industrial
sector, initially leading to increased income inequality. As
industrialization proceeded, however, and the industrial sector comprised a
larger and larger proportion of total employment, further growth of that
sector actually caused inequality to fall. Thus, the Kuznets curve --an
1inverted U-shaped curve -- reflectsthe tendency of inequality to rise and
then fall as industrialization proceeds. Insofar as the U.S. is
sufficiently industrialized to be situated on the declining portion of the
Kuznets curve, one might think that further technological progress would
tend to decrease income inequality.
The main problem one faces in trying to apply the Kuznets model to the
recent economic history of the U.S. is that the model focuses exclusively on
the transformation of an economy from one that is dominated by agriculture
to one that is dominated by industry. In contrast, the central feature of
recent employment changes in the U.S. has been the growth of employment in
the service-producing industries. Since World War II, the U.S. economy has
experienced two major employment shifts: (1) up through the mid-l960's
there was a shift in employment from agriculture to services, with the share
of manufacturing employment holding constant, and (2) from the late 1960's
to the early 1980's, there was a shift in employment from the manufacturing
sector to the service sector (see Urquhart, 1984). This latter shift is
associated with relatively rapid technological change in manufacturing
industries. These facts regarding postwar changes in the structure of
employment in the U.S. suggest that it may not be sensible to apply the
Kuznets curve to recent U.S. experience.
A provocative discussion of the contemporary relationship between
technological change and income inequality, which places great emphasis on
the underlying nature of recent technological change, has been offered by
Wassily Leontief (1982, 1983). According to Leontief, technological change
during a period of industrialization essentially involves machines taking
over many of the physical activities that are traditionally performed by
2people. Since people are still needed to perform mental functions, their
productivity, and consequently their wages, remain high during periods of
industrialization. However, the chief characteristic of recent
technological advances is that machines are increasingly taking over mental
functions previously performed by individuals. Thus, Leontief fears that
income inequality will increase in the future because obsolete labor will
not be able to secure productive employment.
Leontief's prediction that the diffusion of modern technology will lead
to increased income inequality is arguable on several counts. First,
Leontief's assessment of the labor market effects of technological change is
not necessarily accurate. Industrial engineers commonly argue that complex
equipment is most productively used when operated by individuals who are
permitted and encouraged to exercise independent thought to make strategic
interventions in production processes. Insofar as machines are still
greatly inferior to humans in terms of the flexibility of their responses to
different situations, the demand for labor will remain strong. In other
words, the declining need for labor to perform certain routine mental
functions may ultimately be offset by an increasing need for labor to solve
problems that are not routine in nature.
Second, Leontief's (implicit) model applies closely to the
manufacturing sector of the economy but pays little attention to the service
sector. Over the past 2 decades, productivity gains in manufacturing have
been sizable, presumably reflecting the rapid pace of technological progress
in that sector. During the same period, the share of the labor force
employed in manufacturing industries has declined significantly, but this
decline has not been associated with significant increases in technological
3unemployment. Rather, it is associated with an increase in service
employment, a sector of the economy that has demonstrated great absorptive
ability.
Finally, Leontief's discussion fails to specify the way in which
technological change leads to increased income inequality. If technological
change results in lower labor productivity, wage levels will tend to fall
and, at least in the short run, unemployment will tend to rise. Whether
increased inequality is a further result of these changes depends on a
variety of other --verybasic --factors,including the uniformity of the
wage and employment effects across the economy, the wage and employment
structure in the economy, and the flexibility of the labor market. These
factors all interact to determine whether technological progress acts to
increase income inequality, or to decrease it. Insofar as Leontief does not
specify the assumptions he makes about these factors, his assertions are
difficult to assess.
Despite its weaknesses, Leontief's analysis does highlight an important
fact, namely, that understanding the nature of technological change is
critical to assessing its social and economic impacts.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze trends in both income and
earnings inequality over the past two decades and to explore their
association with technological progress. This task is complicated by
several factors. First, technological progress is a complex notion that
potentially subsumes an extraordinarily wide variety of specific advances.
It makes little sense to think of technological progress as a single
variable. Different technological changes can have different impacts on
labor markets, with correspondingly big differences in their effects on
4labor productivity, labor income, and income dispersion. Second, there
appears to be no set of easily measured and easily interpreted variables
that satisfactorily reflect the nature and importance of particular
technological changes, and certainly not of aggregate technological change.
Third, technological change is only one of many factors that lead to changes
in income inequality. Our ability to isolate the influence of technological
change on income inequality is quite limited by well-known difficulties
involved in building a statistical model that controls for the "correct
variables" in the "correct way."
Given these problems, we confine ourselves in this paper largely to a
descriptive analysis in which we measure changes in income and earnings
inequality over the past two decades, a period of time during which
technological change has been so substantial that it has been termed a
"second industrial revolution." Whether any changes in inequality that
occurred over that period are the direct result of technological change is
not the focal point of our analysis. For example, we will not attempt to
determine how much income inequality there would be today if there had been
more or less technological change during the past 10 years. We will,
however, lay out a simple economic framework that provides some clues about
the nature of the inequality measures one might like to calculate and
compare in order to learn about the relationships between technological
change and income and earnings inequality. It is important to stress at the
outset, however, that the effect of technological change on income and
earnings inequality is indeterminate in a general theoretical sense, largely
because technological change can affect the structure of labor demand and of
labor supply in a variety of ways.
5In brief, we find little empirical evidence of an association between
technological change and earnings inequality since the late 1960s. In
contast, there is evidence of a positive association between technological
change and family income inequality, which is likely reflective of the
effect of technological change on the size, structure, and labor supply
behavior of American families.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we present
estimates of a variety of measures of inequality for the years 1967-1985.
In Section III, we discuss a simple economic model of the effect of
technological change on income inequality. Previous empirical literature is
critically reviewed in Section IV. In Section V, we present a detailed
analysis of trends in individual earnings inequality in the U.S., with
emphasis on the analysis of earnings inequality within industries and of the
effect of sectoral shift on overall earnings inequality.Section VI
presents an analysis of changes in the dispersion of income across family
units. Section VII summarizes the main results of the paper and discusses
the principal conclusions.
II. Preliminary Evidence
Before discussing the theoretical linkages between technological
development and the distribution of income, we present evidence concerning
the extent and nature of changes in income inequality in the U.S. over the
years 1967 to 1985. Our source of data is the public use samples of the
March Current Population Surveys for the years 1968 to 1986. Each of these
surveys contains data on a representative sample of U.S. households, with
6information on social, economic, and demographic characteristics of all
household residents, including their income and earnings in the year
preceding the survey. A more complete discussion of the data is provided
later in the paper.
A basic issue that arises in all empirical work on income inequality
involves the formulation of an operational definition of the term
"distribution of income." We stress this point early, since much of the
interpretation of the evidence we present focuses on variations in the
underlying concepts defining a distribution of income. Many of the
conflicting conclusions reached by different studies in this area are
explained by differences in the particular distribution of income that is
analyzed.
In this paper, we wish to draw a sharp distinction between two concepts
of the income distribution. One is the distribution of total family income
across families. For every family in a particular year's sample, we compute
a single income statistic that is the sum of the incomes of all members of
the family. The sources of income included are earnings, interest and
dividend income, and government cash transfers (i.e., this statistic does
not account for noncash transfers or tax obligations). We then measure the
cross-family dispersion of these incomes. Both Census families (two-or-more
related persons living together) and unrelated individuals (individuals
living alone or with other individuals to whom they are not related) are
included in our definition of the family. This distribution is usually
viewed as being closely related to a distribution of economic well-being,
although it does not account for important differences across families such
asthenumber of family members. [1]
7The second distribution on which we focus is the distribution of
earnings across individuals. Only income reported as being the direct
result of work-related activity is included in this distribution. Also,
only those individuals reporting that they worked at some time in the year
preceding the survey are included in the population. [2] In contrast to the
distribution of total family income, families with more than one earner will
be represented more than once in the earnings distribution, while families
with no earners will not be represented at all. This distribution most
closely corresponds to a distribution of job/wage opportunities present in
the labor market. It is related to a distribution of well-being because
earnings is the main component of income, but this relationship is less
close than the relationship between the total family income distribution and
well-being, since the earnings distribution does not include non-labor
income and does not account for sharing of resources within families. As a
result, the dispersion of these two distributions need not move in the same
direction over time.
We measure dispersion of these two distributions in two ways. First,
we compute a Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality that is a
positive function of the degree of inequality. Second, we classify each
income unit (i.e., family or individual) into one of five income (or
earnings) classes based on the relationship of each unit's income to the
median level of income.The classes are defined as follows:
(1) lower class (LC) -incomeless than or equal to 60
percent of the median income;
(2) lower-middle class (LMC) -incomegreater than 60
percent but less than or equal to 100 percent of the
median;
8(3) middle class (MC) -incomegreater than 100 percent but
less than or equal to 160 percent of the median;
(4) upper-middle class (UMC) -incomegreater than 160
percent but less than or equal to 225 percent of the
median;
(5) upper class (UC) -incomegreater than 225 percent of
the median.
This class-based analysis is especially useful for pinpointing the location
of changes in the income distribution; such information is not provided by a
uni-dimensional inequality measure like the Gini coefficient.
The estimated inequality measures for the total family income
distribution for the years 1967-1985 are presented in Table 1. The Cmi
coefficient follows an upward trend over the period, indicating that income
inequality has increased over time. Changes in the percentages of the
population falling in the five income classes reveal that the increase in
income inequality is largely associated with a decline in the share of
families in the middle class and increases in the shares in the upper-middle
and upper classes. No secular change seems to have occurred at the lower
end of the distribution.
The same inequality measures were computed for the earnings
distribution; the results are reported in Table 2. It is clear from these
statistics that there has been no upward trend in earnings inequality. The
class percentages reveal only small changes in the distribution over time:
the upper class percentage seems to have increased, while the lower class
percentage has decreased. [3]
One other feature of the statistics in Tables 1 and 2 deserves mention.
There is a remarkably low correlation (0.29) between the Gini coefficients
for the distributions of total family income and individual earnings. This
9suggests that there were important changes over time in the variables that
differentiate those distributions.
It is tempting to jump from the observation that there has been no
trend in earnings inequality to the conclusion that technological change
since the late l960s has had no effect on the dispersion of income in the
U.S. There are several reasons why we hesitate to do so. First, this
conclusion would rest largely on the presumption that technological change
affects the income distribution via its effect on the distribution of
job/wage opportunities. As described below, the simple theoretical
framework we use to consider the impact of technological change on income
inequality identifies factors that would be expected to change family income
inequality without affecting earnings inequality. Second, as we shall see
below, focusing on the distribution of earnings among all workers masks
significant differences in the trends in earnings inequality for particular
subgroups of workers, e.g., males and females and workers in different
industries. Finally, as noted earlier, simple time-series patterns can be
quite misleading when data are potentially generated by complex multi-factor
models.
III. The Economic Framework
At a theoretical level, technological change can affect the
distributions of income and earnings both through changes in the structure
of labor demand as well as through supply-side variables relating to labor
force participation, hours of work, and family size and structure.
Consider an economy in which identical firms produce a single good
10using capital and two kinds of labor: skilled labor and unskilled labor.
For the time being, we will assume that the supply curves for each type of
labor are perfectly inelastic. In such an economy, technological change can
have three basic effects on the demand for each type of labor. These
effects are (1) a pure technology effect associated with the fact that a
given amount of inputs can be used to produce the same or more output; (2) a
scale effect due to the downward shift of cost curves leading to an increase
in product demand and, concomitantly, in labor demand; and (3) a technical
bias effect arising from the fact that new ratios of factor inputs may be
optimal at the old ratio of factor prices.
Whether technological change leads to a change in earnings inequality
depends on whether there are differences in these 3 effects for skilled and
unskilled labor. Since all firms have the same production functions in this
model (and therefore the same cost curves), the first 2 effects are, by
definition, the same for both types of labor. However, unless technological
change is neutral, signifying that the technical bias effect is zero, labor
demand will shift differently for the 2 types of labor. This should alter
the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, which will cause earnings
inequality to change. For example, if technological change leads to the
substitution of skilled for unskilled labor, earnings inequality will
increase.
If we relax the assumption that the supplies of skilled and unskilled
labor are perfectly inelastic, the change in relative wages (and therefore
the change in earnings inequality) will also depend on the relative slopes
of the supply curves. In the context of the preceding example, if we allow
the supply of unskilled labor to be responsive to the unskilled wage, the
11technical bias effect on earnings inequality will be muted. Of course, the
pure technology effect and the scale effect can also affect earnings
inequality when the supplies of the 2 types of labor are not perfectly
inelastic. Assuming that the supply of unskilled labor is more elastic than
the supply of skilled labor, the negative technology effect on labor demand
will tend to decrease earnings inequality (i.e., because wages of skilled
workers will fall more than the wages of unskilled workers) while the
positive scale effect will tend to increase earnings inequality. Insofar as
the employment shares of skilled and unskilled labor also change when labor
supplies are elastic, these effects can also change sign (see Robinson,
1976). The bottom line of this part of our analysis is that the overall
labor demand effect of technological change on earnings inequality is
theoretically indeterminate. It is indeed remarkable that economic theory
has so little to offer here, despite the strong simplifying assumptions we
have made.
Changes in labor demand can affect the distribution of family income
independently of their effects on earnings inequality. Suppose that all
families have at most one earner, and that technological change leads to an
overall decrease in labor demand, and in employment. Even if earnings
inequality remains unchanged, income inequality will tend to increase. This
difference arises because workers who become technologically unemployed drop
out of the population of earners, but remain in the population of families.
On the other hand, if families can have more than one earner, income
inequality can increase or decrease depending on the income position of the
families whose members become unemployed. Thus, the labor demand effects of
technological change on family income inequality are also indeterminate.
12So far this discussion has focused on the long-run effects of
technological change. In the short run, the effect of technological change
will also depend on the ability of workers to adapt to changes in the
structure of labor demand. For example, workers whose human capital loses
value as a consequence of technological change can respond by investing in
new human capital, by investing in job search, or by taking a lower-wage
job. Their choice among these alternatives will have different implications
for the dynamic pattern of earnings and income inequality.
Technological change can also affect income and earnings inequality via
the supply side of labor markets, i.e., through its effect on labor/leisure,
market-work/home-work choices made within the family. This effect arises
from the impact that technological change has on the nature of commodities
consumed by the household, and on the nature of production within the
household. [4] The major source of such changes in recent years involves
the expanding supply of commodities that reduce the time required to
maintain a household of a given quality (e.g., child care; new products in
food preparation, house cleaning, and home entertainment). Also important
are innovations that allow greater choice as to the type of family to which
an individual belongs (e.g., new methods of contraception).
Significant changes in the family have taken place in recent years.
Here, we focus on the changes related to the increasing proportion of
families headed by an unmarried individual, and to the increasing labor
market activity of married women. According to the March 1968 Current
Population Survey, 8.0 percent of all family units were two-or-more-person
families headed by an unmarried female, and 12.4 percent were females living
alone. By March 1986, 12.8 percent of all families were in the former
13category, and 16.2 percent in the latter. The labor force participation
rate for married women increased from 45.7 percent in 1968 to 57.9 percent
in 1986. The overall labor force participation rate for women also
increased because of the shift to female-headed families, since female heads
tend to have higher labor force participation rates than married women. The
percentage of married women working full-time, year-round also increased,
from 20.3 percent of all married women in 1968 to 28.9 percent in 1986. [5]
This led to an increase in the percentage of married-couple families where
both spouses worked full-time, year-round (15.9 percent in 1968; 21.6
percent in 1986).
It is not clear whether technological progress related to household
production has been mainly a cause or consequence of changes in the
structure of the family and its economic activities. Nonetheless, to the
extent that technological progress has facilitated these changes, it has
played an important role in increasing the labor supply of women and
changing the demographic composition of households. Insofar as changes in
family income inequality reflect changes in the family and changes in
income, it can be argued that technological progress has a supply-side
relationship to income inequality. In addition, depending on how
technological change affects the supplies of skilled and unskilled labor, it
can also affect earnings inequality --ina variety of possible ways.
The main message of this section is that economic theory offers no
unambiguous predictions regarding either the size or even the net direction
of the effect of technological change on family income and earnings
inequality. The issues at hand are completely empirical in nature.
14IV. Previous Empirical Findings
The principal source of information on the distribution of total family
income in the U.S. is the published data contained in the Current Population
Reports P-60 series. These reports are compiled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics from the same March Current Population Survey data used in this
paper. The published statistics relating to family income inequality
reflect the same finding as mentioned earlier: inequality seems to have
increased in recent years. The BLS measures are also available for years
prior to 1967, and show essentially no trend in inequality during most of
the post-World War II period up to 1967. However, the definition of the
family used by the BLS differs from the one used in this paper since the BLS
distributions refer to income inequality among Census families only (i.e.,
our definition includes unrelated individuals as separate income units as
well). The omission of individuals not living in Census families dismisses a
large and growing segment of the U.S. population, and eliminates one route
through which technological change can affect income inequality.
Nonetheless, the basic finding that there has been an upward trend in income
inequality since the late l960s is robust with respect to the definition of
the family.
The claim that family income inequality has increased over the years
1968 to 1985 is not in dispute in the literature in this area. In contrast,
the trend in earnings inequality is a source of much debate among academic
researchers. In this section, we review research findings related to recent
trends in earnings inequality in the U.S. Our major goal is to reconcile
the seemingly conflicting conclusions reached by different investigators.
In reviewing this literature, it should be kept in mind that three
15operational concepts underlie an "income distribution":
1) the population -doesit refer to all earners, males
only, wage and salary workers only, etc.?
2) the income measure -isit all earnings (including
self-employment income), or just wages and salaries?
and,
3) the unit of time -isit annual earnings, weekly
earnings, or hourly earnings?
Careful attention should be paid to the conventions adopted by each
researcher, since different conventions seem to explain much of the cross-
study variance in conclusions. [6]
Differences in findings across studies can also result from the use of
different techniques to measure inequality, e.g. the variance of the
logarithm of earnings or the Cmi coefficient. Differences in the method
used for measuring inequality is another potential explanation for
differences in findings among studies.
We first focus on analyses performed for the distribution of annual
earnings. In a widely-quoted article, Henle and Rsycavage (1980) use
grouped March CPS data to calculate Gini coefficients for all earnings (and
for wages and salaries), separately for men and women, over the period 1958-
1977. They also compute Cmi coefficients when the sample is restricted to
full-time, year-round workers only. [7,8J For men, they find an overall
upward trend in inequality for all earners (with some slowing for the 1970-
1977 period), but no trend for full-time, year-round workers. For women,
they find no trend for all workers, and a downward trend for full-time,
year-round workers. Results for a sample with both sexes combined are not
16provided. The fact that Henle and Rsycavage use grouped data means that the
Gini coefficients are computed from information on the percentage of total
income received by various income quintiles. [9] Plotnick (1982) used the
same grouped data to compute variances of the logarithm of income for all
earnings, but for men only. He finds an upward trend in the variance of
logarithms for the years 1968-1977, the same result reported by Henle and
Rsycavage using Gini coefficients.
Dooley and Gottschalk (1984) use March CPS data on individual male
workers to calculate the variance of logarithms for wage and salary income.
They do this for both annual and weekly earnings over the 1967-1978 period.
[10] They use a sample that is restricted so that it is representative of
civilian males between the ages of 16 and 62 who were either year-round (but
not necessarily full-time) workers in the previous year or were looking for
work in those weeks they were not employed. They find a steep upward trend
in the inequality of annual earnings over the period, with a less-pronounced
increase for the inequality of weekly earnings. In their 1985 paper, they
calculate the percentage of workers in their sample who fall below an
arbitrarily-chosen minimum earnings level, held constant in real terms over
the period. This measure is more closely akin to the concept of absolute
poverty than to the concept of inequality; however, the relatively flat
profile of average earnings over much of this time period implies that this
research can shed some light on earnings dispersion as well. The basic
finding is that both the percentage of males with low annual earnings and
the percentage with low weekly earnings increased over the years 1967-1978.
One problem plaguing both Dooley-Gottschalk papers is that their
samples exclude all individuals who did not respond to the earnings
17questions in the CPS. The Census Bureau uses an imputation procedure for
these nonrespondents that involves allocating to them the earnings level of
an individual with similar characteristics who did respond to the earnings
question. [11] The omission of such individuals would be no cause for
concern if nonresponse was random; however, it is known that individuals
with high actual earnings are more likely to be nonrespondents. Not using
the imputed earnings values for these individuals results in an over-
weighting of individuals with low incomes. [12] For the estimation of a
regression model using CPS microdata, omitting imputed incomes may be an
appropriate strategy (see Welch, 1979); for estimating a population average,
such as a variance of logarithms, it is not.
A recent paper by Harrison, Tilly and Bluestone (1986) uses March CPS
data to look at the inequality of annual wage and salary income, for all
earners, over the years 1964-1983. Using individual-level data to calculate
the variance of logarithms, they find evidence of a "U-turn" in inequality
--thevariance of logarithms fell gradually until the late 1970s, after
which it began to rise sharply. The same pattern emerges when "all
earnings" is the income measure. When the sample is separated by sex, they
find decreasing dispersion for all women over the 1967-1977 period, followed
by a sharp increase. This result for 1967-1977 conflicts with the findings
of Henle-Rsycavage, who find decreasing inequality for females only when the
sample is restricted to females who worked full-time, year-round. Harrison,
et. al., also find virtually no increase in inequality for men over the
1969-1977 period, contradicting the Henle and Rsycavage finding that it
increased. The difference in findings between these studies is not easily
explained. However, it does not appear to be due to the measure of
18inequality used, given Plotnick's finding that the variance of logarithms
increased (consistent with Henle and Rsycavage); neither does it appear to
reflect differences in the earnings variables since Henle and Rsycavage
reach the same conclusion using both "all earnings" and "wage and salary
income." [13] Harrison, et. al., argue that the shift in employment from
the goods-producing sector to the service-producing sector is the primary
reason for their finding of an increase in inequality in earnings inequality
since the late 1970s. [14] However, they do not present any evidence on the
inequality of annual earnings within industrial sectors.
Evidence related to inequality within industries, using weekly earnings
as the income measure, is reported in Lawrence (1984). This study concludes
that the employment shift from goods to services explains only a small part
of the decline from 1969 to 1983 in the proportion of earners who are
"middle-income." Lawrence uses a measure of "usual weekly earnings" from
the CPS that includes only wage and salary income. The sample is restricted
to full-time workers who were employed at the time of the survey. The
income variable -- usualweekly earnings -- isconceptually distinct from
another possible weekly earnings measure -- averageweekly earnings -- which
is calculated as the ratio of annual earnings to weeks worked over the
course of the year. Since usual weekly earnings is available in the CPS
only for individuals who are employed at the time of the survey, the sample
Lawrence uses will have a higher percentage of year-round workers than the
samples used in the analyses of annual earnings inequality.
In Lawrence's study, workers are classified as either low earners
(defined as less than 66 percent of the median level of earnings among
males), high earners (more than 132 percent of the median for males), or
19middle earners. He finds that the percentage of males with "middle
earningst' fell from 56 percent in 1969 to 47 percent in 1983; for females,
it increased from 39 percent to 44 percent; while for both sexes combined it
went from 50 percent to 46 percent. [15]Lawrence also subdivides the
sample according to whether the worker is employed in a goods-producing or a
service-producing industry, and finds that little of the change in the
percentage of middle earners can be attributed to the increase in the
proportion of service workers from 1969 to 1983. Rather, the middle-class
decline occurred within the service sector and, especially, within the goods
sector. No data for intervening years are analyzed by Lawrence.
Rosenthal (1985) examines the same hypothesis as Lawrence --thatthe
middle of the earnings distribution has declined -- but,unlike Lawrence,
comes to the conclusion that no decline occurred. While Rosenthal uses the
same income measure as Lawrence -- usualweekly earnings for full-time
workers -- hisanalysis varies from that of Lawrence in several ways.
Rosenthal separates 416 three-digit occupations into thirds based on the
median income among workers in the occupation in 1982 (i.e., the "top third"
contains the 33 percent highest-paying occupations). He then calculates the
percentage of employees in the occupations that make up each of the thirds
of the occupational ranking, for both 1973 and 1982. He finds that the
fraction of workers in the "middle third" did not change over the period,
while there was a decline in employment in the lower third and an increase
in the top third. Thus, the highest-paying occupations also have the
highest rate of employment growth. Including part-time workers does not
change the basic conclusion.
Rosenthal's analysis provides incomplete information on the extent to
20which the overall change in inequality is due to a changing occupational
structure because it ignores all variation of incomes within occupations.
It also ignores any changes in the variation of incomes across occupations
that fall within the bottom third, middle third, and top third of the
occupational ranking. Contrary to the claims made in his conclusion, his
study does not address the question of whether the earnings distribution has
seen a decline in its "middle." However, Rosenthal's study nicely
complements the Lawrence study, in that together they cast doubt on the
hypotheses about broad industry and broad occupational shifts being
responsible for any increase in weekly earnings inequality that may have
occurred. [16]
The only recent analysis of hourly wages has been conducted by Medoff
(1984). This study has sample restrictions that are similar to those of
Lawrence, and uses data on "usual weekly earnings" and "usual weekly hours
worked" to compute an hourly earnings measure for employed individuals in
the May CPS for various years. [17] Medoff finds that the variance of the
logarithm of hourly earnings was at about the same level in 1984 as it was
in 1973 and 1975. However, his results do show that earnings inequality
increased from 1981 to 1984 (which he attributes to changes in the
macroeconomic environment). He separates the samples for males and females
and finds little evidence of a trend in hourly earnings inequality for
either. He does, however, find evidence of increasing inequality within the
manufacturing sector for the 1980s relative to 1973-1975, but a slight
(though uneven) decrease in inequality for the nonmanufacturing sector. [18]
What is the bottom line on trends in earnings inequality? As should be
clear from the foregoing discussion, different studies have reached widely
21varying conclusions. Unfortunately, since these studies typically use
methods that also vary widely, it is difficult to infer much about the trend
in earnings inequality. For example, Medoff finds no increase in inequality
in wages and salaries from 1973 to 1983, while Harrison, et. al., do find an
increase. This conflict could be due to differences in the underlying
populations analyzed (Medoff excludes public and agricultural workers, and
any individual not employed at the time of the survey), different income
measures (ttusual earnings versus earnings in the previous year) and
different time periods (hourly versus annual). The only directly comparable
results among the studies reviewed are from Plotnick and Harrison, et. al.,
for male annual earnings inequality in the late 1960's-early 1970's period;
yet even here Plotnick finds an increasing trend, while Harrison, et. al.,
do not. [l9J
The weight of the evidence does, nonetheless, seem to suggest an
increase in male earnings inequality and a decrease in female earnings
inequality over the years 1967-1975. It also appears that male earnings
inequality increased from 1975 to 1983, while the results for females and
all earners do not strongly support any conclusion.
V. Trends and Patterns in Earnings Inequality
In this section, we analyze earnings inequality over the years 1968 to
1985. We extend the empirical analysis presented in Section II in several
ways. First we consider inequality for males and females separately.
Second, we attempt to control for variations in hours worked by restricting
the population to full-time, year-round workers. Finally, we examine
inequality within six industrial sectors to see if there are any cross-
22industry differences.
Before presenting the results, we discuss the source of our data. We
also discuss our approach to measuring inequality.
A. Data
The data we analyze are drawn from the March Current Population Survey
public use samples for the nineteen years from 1968 to 1986. These data are
commonly used in studies of income inequality in the U.S. We use 10 percent
samples of the original data. For our purposes, a major strength of the CPS
data is that they are representative of the U.S. population. Observations
with imputed incomes are included in our analysis, and sample weights are
used in our computations. [20]
The March CPS data are not without their shortcomings. One undesirable
characteristic of these data is a tendency for certain sources of income to
be underreported by survey respondents. This is not a problem for the
earnings measures, since earnings, especially wage and salary income, tends
to be well-reported. However, both cash transfers and interest/dividend
income are not well-reported, and these sources show up in the family income
measures used later. We assume that such underreporting is fairly stable
over time and therefore does not bias inferences concerning the trend in
inequality, although it does limit our ability to measure inequality
accurately at a point in time. The fact that the share of income received
as transfers has not grown since 1973 supports this assumption.
Another problem that arises for the family income distribution but not
for the earnings distribution is the fact that the family is defined at the
time of the survey, which is in March, although the reported income
23corresponds to the previous calendar year. If changes in the composition of
a family occur between the time income is reported and the time the survey
is taken, then the measure of total family income may not reflect the actual
income received by the family. Burkhauser, et. al. (1986) have looked at
the effect of this problem on measures of the transition into poverty among
newly-widowed women, and have found that the bias for estimated transition
probabilities can be large. However, they found the bias for the overall
poverty rate to be small, suggesting that the problem may be relatively
minor when calculating aggregate inequality measures.
There is also a "top-coding" problem with the earnings data that does
not seem to have been fully appreciated in earlier research using the CPS.
There are three sources of information on earnings in the March CPS data:
wage and salary income, farm self-employment income, and non-farm self-
employment income. Prior to the 1981 survey, these three sources of earned
income were never recorded as being above $50,000 --innominal dollars.
All incomes greater than that amount were coded as equal to $50,000. Given
the substantial inflation over the 1967-1980 period, the effect of holding
the top-coded income level constant was to reduce the upper bound for the
earnings measure -- inreal terms -- overtime. Narrowing the bounds within
which income can be reported will bias most inequality measures downward.
We deal with this problem by recoding earnings so that no figure above
50,000 dollars in 1980 terms will be used, i.e., we use a consistent real-
dollar top-code over the 1967-1985 period. [21] Our analysis of changes in
inequality does not, therefore, account for changes in the shape of the
upper tail of the income distribution.
24B. Measuring Inequality
The purpose of an income inequality index is to summarize the degree of
income dispersion among N income-receiving units. There are many measures
of inequality, each of which implicitly weights the sample data differently
(see Atkinson, 1970; Champernowne, 1974). Since different inequality
measures can sometimes lead to different results, we base our analysis on
three single-number inequality indices: the Gini coefficient; the mean
logarithmic deviation; and the coeffecient of variation. [22] All three
measures satisfy the main properties that are generally considered desirable
for an inequality index. However, each index is particularly sensitive to
changes in different parts of the income distribution: the mean logarithmic
deviation to changes at lower levels of income; the coefficient of variation
to changes at higher levels of income; and the Cmi coefficient to changes
around the middle of the income distribution.
We also continue to use the more descriptive class measures outlined in
Section II. A weakness of this measurement scheme is its insensitivity to
changes that might occur within classes of the distribution. However, in
practice, this group of measures does seem to highlight much of the change
in the shape of the distribution. These measures also have an attractive
characteristic that the three indices mentioned above do not: the class
measures are not biased by the top-coding of incomes in the CPS. This is
because the cutoff point for the upper class, i.e., 225 percent of the
median income, always lies below the level at which earned income was top-
coded. The upper-class cutoff for the family income distributions discussed
in Section VI also lies beneath the top-code.
25C. Results for Earnings
The Cmi coefficient and the class percentages for the distribution of
earnings among all individuals are reported in Table 2. Table 3 extends the
results by presenting the mean logarithmic deviation and the coefficient of
variation for the same distribution for the years 1967-1985. Table 3 also
reports the three inequality measures for the earnings distribution when the
population is restricted to full-time, year-round workers. Our earlier
conclusion that earnings inequality has not changed significantly since the
late l960s is further supported by examination of these additional measures.
Each time series of a particular inequality index in Table 3 was
regressed on a simple trend variable to provide a descriptive measure of the
time trend in inequality. Regressions of each inequality index on a trend
and the adult male unemployment rate were also fit in an attempt to describe
the trend in inequality controlling, at least crudely, for business cycle
effects on inequality. [23]
The estimated trend coefficients in the earnings inequality regressions
are presented at the bottom of Table 3. The conclusion that earnings
inequality has not increased over time is supported by the estimates. The
trend coefficient for all workers is small and insignificant when the
dependent variable is the coefficient of variation, while it is significant
and negative for the mean logarithmic deviation. We noted earlier in the
discussion of Table 2 that the lower class percentage for the earnings
distribution fell over the period, while there was a slight increase in the
upper-class percentage. The difference in trend coefficients for the
coefficient of variation and the mean logarithmic deviation reflects the
relatively greater sensitivity of the mean logarithmic deviation to changes
26at the lower end of the distribution. [24]
Table 4 reports earnings inequality measures calculated separately for
males and females. The statistics in this table reveal that there were
widely different trends in earnings inequality for males and females who
worked in the years 1967-1985. [25] Earnings inequality did not change for
females who worked full-time, year-round, and actually fell for all women.
In contrast, earnings inequality for males increases, both for the
population of all workers, and for full-time, year-round workers only.
Blackburn (1987) presents evidence that the increase in earnings inequality
for males is the result of changes in the age composition of the male labor
force and, to a lesser extent, industrial shifts. [26]
Restricting the population to full-time, year-round workers is an
attempt to control for changes over time in hours worked. A slightly
different way to control for hours worked is to examine the distribution of
hourly wage rates. [27] We are able to compute wage rates using the March
CPS data by dividing the annual earnings measure for each individual by the
product of weeks worked and hours worked per week for that same individual.
Unfortunately, the information on hours worked is only available beginning
with the 1976 survey. Table 5 reports the mean logarithmic deviation and
the coefficient of variation for hourly wages, reported separately for males
and females, over the 1975-1985 period. There is much variance in the
indices over time (especially for the coefficient of variation), making it
difficult to pinpoint any trend. It would seem that there is no clear trend
for either males or females, except perhaps an increasing trend for male
wage inequality when the mean logarithmic deviation is the index used.
27D. Earnings by Industry
This section analyzes trends in earnings inequality within and across
industries. As mentioned earlier, there has been a shift over time from
goods-oriented to service-oriented employment. For instance, 41 percent of
full-time, year-round workers were employed in goods-producing industries in
1967, with the remaining 59 percent employed in the service-producing
industries. By 1984, the goods-producing share of employment had fallen to
31 percent, while the service-producing share had risen to 69 percent. Since
inequality is higher within service-producing industries, this shift would,
other things equal, tend to increase overall earnings inequality.
Table 6 reports Cmi coefficients for earnings within six broad
industrial groupings. [28] Only full-time, year-round workers are included
in the samples analyzed here. It is apparent that there are substantial
differences in the level of earnings inequality within these industry
groups, with manufacturing, public administration, and the "traditional"
services groups having the lowest Cmi coefficients, and the services,
trade, and other goods sectors having the highest levels of inequality. [29]
The share of full-time, year-round workers in the three industries with
higher inequality increased from 49.7 percent in 1967 to 54.9 percent in
1984. This employment shift contributed to increased earnings inequality,
although the magnitude of the effect is small. We can calculate this
magnitude using a decomposition of the mean logarithmic deviation that
allows us to express changes in inequality as a simple function of changes
in industry employment shares, changes in industry mean incomes, and changes
in inequality within industries (see Bourguignon, 1979). Using this
property, we calculate that the industry employment shifts can account for
28an increase in the mean logarithmic deviation of .005, or about 40 percent
of the (small) total increase from .207 in 1967 to .219 in 1984. [30]
These results provide little support for the Harrison, Tilly, and Bluestone
argument that sectoral shift has led to increased earnings inequality.
Earnings inequality did not move in the same direction for each
industrial sector between 1967 and 1985. For instance, inequality increased
in manufacturing, traditional services, and public adminstration, fell
slightly in services and other goods, and held steady in trade. As a
result, there was less variation in the level of inequality across
industries in 1985 than in 1967.
VI. The Family Income Distribution
This section presents a more detailed examination of trends in the
distribution of income when the family is the unit of analysis. As
discussed in Section III, technological change can influence supply-side
behavior in a way that affects income inequality measured across families
without affecting earnings inequality measured across individuals. Indeed,
the empirical facts reported in Section II are consistent with the
hypothesis that the effects of technological change on the distribution of
well-being operate primarily through the supply side, and not the demand
side, of labor markets.
As we alluded to earlier, there are conceptual problems with the income
data available from the Current Population Survey. Ideally, one would like
to have a measure of income that closely reflects the level of economic
well-being of the family unit. The CPS income measure falls short of this
ideal in several ways. First, it does not include non-cash transfers, nor
29does it include capital gains income. Second, there is no natural control
for the fact that families with different compositions will derive different
amounts of well-being from the same level of income. Third, CPS income data
refer to pre-tax income. With regard to this last point, Pechman (1987)
shows that there has been little change in the progressivity of the tax
system from 1966 to 1985. [31] This finding makes the use of pre-tax income
in studying the dispersion of incomes somewhat less objectionable. [32]
In Section II, it was shown that there was an increase in total family
income inequality over the years 1967 to 1985. To investigate the sources
of this trend, we now consider three related distributions. First, we
examine the distribution of equivalent income, which lets us control, though
imperfectly, for the effects of family composition. Second, we examine the
distribution of total family earnings, which allows us to assess the
importance of changes in the distribution of income that families receive
from the labor market. This distribution is compared to the distribution of
earnings among families' principal earners. This latter distribution allows
us to examine inequality among families when the number of earners per
family is held constant.
-
A.Equivalent Income
The income measure for the distribution of equivalent income is
constructed by dividing the level of income for each family by the number of
equivalent adults in the family, determined through a set of equivalence
scales. Each person is assigned the equivalent income of his or her
family, with inequality measured across persons. As pointed out by Danziger
and Taussig (1979), this distribution relates more closely to well-being
30than the distribution of family income since it explicitly recognizes
certain key differences among families (e.g., that large families need more
income to achieve a given level of welfare than small families). The
equivalence scales used are those implicit in the BLS poverty lines
developed by Orshansky (1965).
The results for the distribution of equivalent income are reported in
Table 7. The Gini coefficient increases for this distribution, as it did
for the distribution of total family income. However, unlike the increase
in total family income inequality, most of the increase for equivalent
income occurred in the last five years studied. Looking at the class
percentages, the major change appears to be a movement from the lower-middle
class to the lower class.
B. Total Family Earnings
The distribution of total family earnings uses the sum of the earnings
of each member of a family as the measure of income for that family. Some
families have zero total earnings over the year in question; these families
are dropped from our sample. This makes the sample comparable to the sample
used for the distribution of earnings among principal earners that we
discuss below.The total family earnings distribution suffers from the
inconsistent top-code problem mentioned in Section V. We deal with this
problem by using income-class shares to study changes in the shape of the
distribution and to compare its shape with other distributions.
Table 8 contains class breakdowns for the family earnings distribution.
The inequality of family earnings appears to have increased over the years
1967 to 1985. Changes in the upper end of the distribution are similar to
those that occurred for the distribution of total family income. There was
31also a shift from the lower-middle to the lower class, which does not occur
for the total family income distribution.
C. The Principal Earner
For each family, we define the principal earner to be (roughly) the
family member with the highest level of earnings in the previous year. [33]
We use this construct as an alternative to the "head of the household,"
since the Census Bureau's definition of the household head changed over the
1967-1985 period. [34] Reported earnings were consistently top-coded at
$50,000, in 1980 dollars, in the same manner as described in Section V for
the earnings of all individuals.
The class breakdown and the Cmi coefficient for the distribution of
earnings among principal earners are reported in Table 9. As with the
distribution of total family earnings, we observe a rise in the lower class
and upper class shares that coincides with a fall in the middle class share.
Table 10 reports the Cmi coefficient and the mean logarithmic deviation for
principal earners separately by sex, and by full-time, year-round status.
The trends are similar to those observed for the distributions of individual
earnings, with inequality rising for males and falling for females. The
fact that males constitute a larger fraction of the principal earner
population than of the all-earners populations explains why earnings
inequality for principal earners increases, whereas no increase is observed
for the earnings distribution measured across all earners.
A change in the percentage of principal earners who work full-time,
year-round might also be expected to affect earnings inequality among
principal earners. Suprisingly, there was little change in this statistic
32from 1967 to 1985. Table 11 reports the percentage of principal earners who
worked full-time, year-round for four types of families in both 1967 and
1985. The statistics reveal a shift from married-couple families to non-
traditional families and a decline in the proportion of full-time year-round
workers among female-headed single parent families.These changes would
have led to a decline in the full-time year-round percentage for all
principal earners, since married couples have the highest probability of
having a full-time, year-round principal earner. However, their effect
seems to have been offset by increases in the percentages of female
unrelated individuals and male-headed single-parent families and unrelated
individuals who work full-time, year-round. [35]
In Blackburn and Bloom (1987), we presented results suggesting that the
growth in married females' earnings has not contributed to increasing
inequality of total family income over the years 1967-1984. However,
comparing the class percentages for total family earnings and earnings among
principal earners suggests that the earnings of non-principal earners has
had a positive impact on inequality. Both distributions have become more
disperse over time, but the change is larger for the distribution of total
family earnings. To describe these changes more precisely, we fit
regressions of the lower-class, middle-class, and upper-class percentages
for the two distributions on a time trend, and on a time trend and the adult
male unemployment rate. The results are reported in Table 12. The trend
coefficients are uniformly smaller (in absolute value) for the principal
earner distribution, and are much smaller when looking at the upper class
percentages. This indicates that a significantly larger percentage of
families were moved into the upper class when using all earnings -- which
33includes the earnings of non-principal earners --thanwhen only the
earnings of principal earners are included. This implies that changing
family behavior related to the labor force participation of its members has
had a positive impact on the inequality of total family income.
VII. Conclusion
This paper has explored the relationship between technological change
and inequality in the U.S. since the late 1960's. Because technological
change is so difficult to characterize and measure at an aggregate level,
our analysis has focused primarily on studying patterns and trends in the
dispersion of various distributions of earnings and income during this
recent period of rapid technological progress. If technological change is
related to inequality, we would expect the inequality data for this period
to reveal systematic patterns. Although economic theory has little to offer
regarding the nature of such patterns, it does provide some useful
suggestions about the type of income and earnings distributions one might
study and compare to explore the linkage between technological change and
inequality. Thus, under the assumption that the impact of technological on
inequality operates primarily through the demand side of labor markets -- by
altering the nature of jobs and therefore of wage opportunities -- wewould
expect to see shifts in the inequality of earnings measured across
individuals. In contrast, if the impact of technological change has
affected inequality primarily as a supply-side phenomenon --throughchanges
in decisions about family size, structure, and labor supply -- wewould
expect to see limited changes in earnings inequality measured across
34individuals, but sizable changes in the distribution of total family income
measured across families.
On the basis of our review of relevant literature, and several
empirical analyses we performed using microdata from the March Current
Population Surveys from 1968 to 1986, we have four main sets of results to
report.
1. The often-contradictory conclusions reached by studies of recent trends
in income and earnings inequality are largely explained by the reliance of
different researchers on a remarkably wide range of data analytic
conventions. For example, the list of important dimensions in which
previous studies vary includes (1) the time period covered; (2) theway
family units are defined; (3) the population to which the studies of
individual earnings generalize (e.g., all earners, private non-agricultural
workers, male earners, wage and salary workers, full-time year-round
workers, etc.);(4) the measures of earnings and income (e.g., total family
income, equivalent family income, total family earnings, wage and salary
income, etc.); (5) the unit of time for the measurement of earnings (e.g.,
annual, weekly, or hourly); (6) the nature of the earnings measure (e.g.,
usual earnings, or average earnings); (7) measures of inequality(e.g., the
Cmi coefficient, income-class shares, variance of logarithms, coefficient
of variation, mean logarithmic deviation, etc.); (8) the use of individual
or grouped income/earnings data; (9) the treatment of sample weights; (10)
the treatment of observations with imputed incomes; (11) the handling of
top-coded values of income and earnings; and (12) other criteria for
including observations in the sample such as the age of the respondent and
whether the respondent was working at the time of thesurvey or in the year
35preceding the survey.
2. The time profile of earnings inequality, measured across individual
workers has been quite flat since the late 1960's. Among females, earnings
inequality fell over time, although it was flat for women who worked full-
time, year-round. In contrast, earnings inequality increased for males,
both among the population of all workers and that of full-time, year-round
workers. The upward trend in earnings inequality for males is less apparent
if one focuses on the dispersion in hourly earnings, suggesting that some of
the increase in the dispersion of annual earnings is due to increased
dispersion in the supply of labor by males. In related work, Blackburn
(1987) presents evidence that the increase in earnings inequality for males
is closely related to changes in the age composition of the male labor force
and somewhat related to changes in employment shares across industries.
3. Earnings inequality among full-time, year-round workers varies
substantially across industries. Although high-inequality industries
increased their share of total employment from 1967 to 1984, this change can
only account for a small fraction of the small increase in earnings
inequality over those years. Thus, our results provide little support for
either part of the compound hypothesis that earnings inequality has
increased and that the increase was primarily the result of sectoral shift
in the U.S. economy.
4. Inequality of total family income and total family earnings increased
from 1967 to 1985. Inequality of equivalent income (i.e., total family
income divided by the number of equivalent adults in the family) also tended
to increase over this period, though most of the increase took place in the
1980's. Dispersion in the distribution of earnings among families'
36principal earners also increased since the late 1960's, although the overall
increase reflects a combination of an increase for male principal earners
and a decrease for female principal earners. A comparison of the magnitude
of changes in the inequality of total family earnings and of earnings among
principal earners leads one to conclude further that the earnings of non-
principal earners has had a positive effect on income inequality over the
past two decades.
The main message of this paper is that there is little empirical
evidence that earnings inequality has increased since the late 1960's, and
even less evidence to support the hypothesis that any changes that have
occurred have resulted from the effect of technological change on the demand
for labor. However, the fact that inequality of total family income
increased since the late 1960's, and that some of the increase appears to be
due to changes in family composition and labor supply behavior, is
consistent with the hypothesis that technological change has had positive
supply-side effects on income inequality in the United States.
Unfortunately, the nebulous nature of technological change, the multiplicity
of ways in which technological change can affect inequality, and the fact
that inequality is influenced by many other economic and demographic forces
as well, makes it impossible to know whether recent trends in inequality
will continue into the future.
37Table 1
Inequality Measures for the Distribution
of Total Family Income [*]
Year Cmi LC LMC MC UMC UC
1967 .395 .297 .203 .275 .143 .083
1968 .389 .296 .204 .274 .145 .080
1969 .393 .294 .206 .258 .151 .091
1970 .406 .304 .196 .261 .144 .095
1971 .405 .300 .200 .251 .142 .107
1972 .404 .297 .203 .256 .142 .102
1973 .403 .299 .201 .253 .140 .108
1974 .393 .302 .198 .262 .143 .095
1975 .400 .291 .209 .257 .139 .103
1976 .410 .306 .194 .237 .152 .112
1977 .409 .306 .194 .238 .144 .117
1978 .402 .296 .204 .229 .152 .119
1979 .412 .307 .193 .230 .155 .115
1980 .392 .297 .203 .246 .144 .110
1981 .412 .299 .201 .235 .145 .119
1982 .414 .307 .193 .232 .142 .126
1983 .425 .313 .187 .219 .148 .132
1984 .416 .298 .202 .225 .145 .130
1985 .426 .297 .203 .213 .145 .142
[*} The population includes both Census families and
unrelated individuals. The class measures are defined in the
text. Total family income includes earned income, interest and
dividend income, and government cash transfer income.
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Inequality Measures for the Distribution of Annual
Earnings Across Individuals [*]
Year Gini LC LMC MC UMC UC
1967 .459 .344 .156 .202 .155 .143
1968 .462 .353 .147 .203 .164 .133
1969 .466 .348 .152 .195 .163 .142
1970 .466 .345 .155 .208 .157 .135
1971 .472 .348 .152 .195 .162 .143
1972 .472 .336 .144 .197 .162 .141
1973 .474 .353 .147 .191 .149 .160
1974 .466 .347 .153 .188 .160 .152
1975 .468 .345 .155 .198 .148 .155
1976 .469 .349 .151 .208 .135 .156
1977 .468 .343 .157 .185 .152 .163
1978 .461 .336 .164 .195 .140 .165
1979 .464 .335 .165 .200 .154 .146
1980 .454 .328 .172 .212 .149 .138
1981 .460 .335 .165 .211 .144 .145
1982 .470 .345 .155 .194 .142 .164
1983 .464 .351 .149 .210 .137 .154
1984 .468 .331 .169 .189 .135 .176
1985 .467 .338 .162 .201 .131 .168
[*] The earnings measure includes both wage and salary
income and self-employment income. All individuals with positive









Other Measures of Inequality for the Distribution of
Annual Earnings Across Individual [*]
[*] Full-time, year-round workers are
individuals who worked 35 or more hours per







reported. MLD is the mean logarithmic deviation, and CV is the
coefficient of variation.
AllEarners Full-time,Year-roundOnly
Year MLD CV Cmi MLD CV
1967 .608 .856 .313 .207 .588
1968 .609 .857 .308 .206 .574
1969 .630 .865 .302 .186 .560
1970 .630 .865 .307 .194 .571
1971 .638 .880 .310 .191 .577
1972 .629 .878 .307 .202 .568
1973 .627 .882 .310 .200 .573
1974 .601 .870 .310 .205 .578
1975 .604 .875 .299 .170 .558
1976 .603 .879 .303 .187 .564
1977 .616 .870 .300 .180 .554
1978 .583 .859 .302 .187 .562
1979 .600 .868 .309 .193 .576
1980 .560 .851 .302 .184 .569
1981 .577 .858 .311 .201 .585
1982 .597 .891 .323 .222 .607
1983 .600 .869 .319 .232 .592
1984 .600 .881 .322 .219 .602





























1967 .389.468 .477.630 .281.174 .283.178
1968 .390.460 .481.636 .278.171 .278.186
1969 .398.477 .488.677 .272.161 .272.151
1970 .401.499 .481.649 .281.178 .265.139
1971 .406.496 .485.661 .284.172 .265.141
1972 .405.483 .480.649 .278.181 .259.142
1973 .403.479 .481.633 .278.171 .267.153
1974 .401.468 .476.617 .282.181 .275.164
1975 .406.473 .478.622 .276.153 .255.122
1976 .408.481 .470.600 .280.171 .252.135
1977 .405.490 .475.624 .274.166 .256.127
1978 .403.460 .466.603 .277.161 .259.157
1979 .408.478 .456.606 .285.176 .253.134
1980 .399.436 .454.584 .278.153 .259.165
1981 .411.486 .452.572 .293.196 .263.138
1982 .428.509 .461.593 .301.203 .279.177
1983 .423.527 .460.591 .301.231 .282.176
1984 .428.519 .460.593 .308.206 .275.178
1985 .424.491 .468.612 .305.197 .288.184
.18 .15 - .12-.36 .14 .19 .02 .06





Inequality Measures for the Distribution of Wages,
for Males and Females [*]
Males Females
Year MLD CV MLD CV
1975 .253 .752 .235 .865
1976 .271 .781 .215 .752
1977 .253 .728 .241 .937
1978 .251 .767 .248 .947
1979 .257 .689 .261 .870
1980 .226 .654 .273 .967
1981 .273 .748 .228 .793
1982 .280 .748 .242 .752
1983 .271 .753 .256 .777
1984 .291 .767 .280 .950
1985 .277 .753 .290 .869
[*] The wages were computed as annual earnings divided by
the product of hours worked per week and weeks worked over





Gini Coefficients For Earnings Within Industry Groups,
Full-time, Year-round Workers [*]
.0012 -.0010 .0013 .0005 -.0008 .0008
(.0003) (.0007) (.0004)(.0004) (.0009) (.0006)
.0014 -.0034
(.0005) (.0009)
.0011 .0009 -.0011 .0014
(.0007)(.0007) (.0012) (.0011)
[*] "Other goods" includes agriculture, construction and
mining. "Traditional Services" includes transportation,
communications, public utilities, financial services, insurance,
and real estate. "Services" includes personal, business and




Year Manuf. Goods ServicesTradeServicesAdmn.
1967 .266 .368 .269 .345 .363 .240
1968 .263 .377 .278 .329 .355 .226
1969 .266 .324 .266 .334 .349 .246
1970 .270 .370 .276 .324 .342 .240
1971 .257 .374 .293 .336 .338 .256
1972 .273 .352 .285 .339 .324 .249
1973 .279 .333 .277 .332 .348 .258
1974 .273 .360 .285 .341 .325 .282
1975 .265 .333 .270 .327 .321 .257
1976 .261 .366 .277 .325 .325 .258
1977 .265 .339 .269 .329 .322 .245
1978 .284 .315 .273 .323 .323 .226
1979 .267 .346 .287 .340 .328 .268
1980 .275 .323 .289 .321 .318 .250
1981 .270 .362 .290 .340 .328 .245
1982 .286 .355 .297 .341 .351 .246
1983 .286 .360 .293 .345 .330 .273
1984 .287 .351 .298 .342 .336 .271





Inequality Measures for the Distribution of Equivalent Income
Across Persons in the U.S.
Year Cmi LC LMC MC UMC UC
1967 .367 .255 .245 .277 .129 .094
1968 .360 .237 .263 .287 .126 .087
1969 .364 .246 .254 .276 .131 .094
1970 .367 .242 .258 .273 .139 .088
1971 .371 .239 .261 .277 .128 .095
1972 .362 .245 .255 .290 .125 .084
1973 .363 .233 .267 .269 .143 .088
1974 .362 .243 .257 .284 .130 .086
1975 .364 .254 .246 .267 .144 .089
1976 .367 .255 .245 .291 .125 .084
1977 .358 .251 .249 .276 .140 .083
1978 .361 .243 .257 .273 .140 .087
1979 .363 .252 .248 .274 .141 .086
1980 .357 .257 .243 .283 .138 .079
1981 .380 .271 .229 .270 .139 .091
1982 .390 .270 .230 .253 .145 .102
1983 .395 .280 .220 .259 .135 .106
1984 .391 .280 .220 .272 .128 .100
1985 .394 .273 .227 .260 .137 .103
44Table 8
Inequality Measures for the Distribution
of Total Family Earnings [*J
Year LC LMC MC UMC UC
1967 .263 .237 .293 .141 .066
1968 .256 .244 .308 .129 .063
1969 .265 .235 .289 .137 .074
1970 .275 .225 .297 .129 .074
1971 .283 .217 .286 .133 .080
1972 .270 .230 .282 .135 .083
1973 .268 .232 .273 .139 .088
1974 .281 .219 .286 .136 .078
1975 .272 .228 .277 .137 .086
1976 .281 .219 .271 .138 .091
1977 .288 .212 .268 .148 .084
1978 .285 .215 .266 .144 .090
1979 .297 .203 .269 .141 .090
1980 .279 .221 .265 .148 .087
1981 .278 .222 .271 .138 .091
1982 .292 .208 .252 .140 .108
1983 .294 .206 .248 .148 .103
1984 .287 .213 .249 .151 .100
1985 .286 .214 .229 .155
[*] The relevant population includes only those families
with positive earnings for the year in question.
45Table 9
Inequality Measures for the Distribution of Earnings
Among Principal Earners [*J
Year Gini LC LMC MC UMC UC
1967 .346 .252 .248 .314 .130 .056
1968 .342 .236 .264 .331 .104 .065
1969 .351 .261 .239 .315 .123 .061
1970 .357 .260 .240 .316 .115 .069
1971 .360 .268 .232 .320 .112 .068
1972 .359 .248 .252 .305 .117 .078
1973 .354 .264 .236 .295 .133 .073
1974 .360 .271 .229 .325 .114 .061 1fl7£/J )7.JJ/ 1I\ .LJU'A .LJ,J flO(.LO1)7 .1..)! $7/.'J,'-4
1976 .367 .270 .230 .279 .140 .082
1977 .357 .276 .224 .302 .133 .065
1978 .362 .261 .239 .278 .146 .076
1979 .367 .276 .224 .280 .141 .079
1980 .357 .254 .246 .294 .138 .067
1981 .360 .252 .248 .294 .128 .077
1982 .375 .283 .217 .291 .126 .082
1983 .373 .285 .215 .281 .146 .073
1984 .372 .271 .229 .294 .124 .082
1985 .374 .277 .223 .273 .140 .086
[*] The principal earner is defined as the head of household
for non-married couple families. For married couples, the
principal earner is the spouse with the higher level of earnings
in the year preceding the survey.
46Table 10
Earnings Inequality Among Principal Earners,
Males and Females
AllWorkers Full-time,Year-round
Males Females Males Females
Year GiniMLDCmiMLD GiniMLDCmiMLD
.416.452 .264.146 .295
1968 .302.217 .417.439 .263.140 .307
1969 .309.244 .417.407 .260.143 .297.178
1970 .316.254 .408.441 .267.150 .291.159
1971 .319.246 .420.460 .268.135 .272.139
1972 .317.258 .409.487 .264.153 .270
1973 .312.251 .402.435 .262.148 .261
.161
.130
1974 .317.260 .395.447 .264.148 .253.139
1975 .320.242 .393.413 .262.131 .249
1976 .326.264 .393.411 .265.145 .250
1977 .312.236 .385.418 .255.145 .257
1978 .321.254 .396.418 .263.134 .256.127
1979 .323.264 .385.415 .265-.149 .255.122
1980 .318.241 .382.405 .260.129 .260.138
1981 .322.256 .381.380 .272.155 .266.140
1982 .338.281 .393.379 .280.163 .280
1983 .335.294 .397.392 .277.173 .287.163
1984 .340.289 .386.414 .282.160 .272.161
1985 .334.260 .402.410 .277.153 .277.137








Coeff. .10 .13 - .17- .22 .06 .06 .14 .23






Percentage of Principal Earners Working Full-time, Year-round,





Family Type 1967 1985 1967 1985
Married-Couple 78.4 79.1 77.3 65.3
Male-Headed Single-
Parent Family 62.5 67.2 8.6 15.5
or Unrelated
Individual
Female-Headed Single- 63.3 51.8 5.9 10.6
Parent Family
Female Unrelated 48.5 65.7 8.2 10.9
Individual
All Families and
Unrelated 73.7 73.0 100.0 100.0
Individuals
[*] The percentages reported in this table pertain to the
population of families with principal earners who have positive
earnings, and do not apply to the population of all families.
48Table 12
Trend Regressions for the Total Family Earnings and the













Trend .0015- .0031 .0022 .0014- .0024 .0010
Coeff. (.0003)(.0002)(.0002) (.0004)(.0004)(.0002)
Trend
Coeff. .0013- .0032 .0018 .0010- .0025 .0009
Without (.0006)(.0005)(.0004) (.0007)(.0008)(.0004)
Cycle
[*] The dependent variable is the class percentage series
for either the lower (LC), middle (MC), or upper (UC) class, for
either the total family earnings or principal earner
distributions.
49NOTES
1.The correspondence between the income of a family and its well-
being is only approximate. Several pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors are
omitted in the analysis, such as cross-family variations in wealth,
variations in price levels across regions of the country, etc. We also
treat each family identically, though some otherwise-equivalent families may
receive higher levels of utility from a given level of income than other
families. Families also differ in their income needs, e.g., larger families
tend to need more income than smaller families to enjoy the same standard of
living. This latter factor is taken into account later in the paper.
2. The actual restriction is that only individuals with positive
earnings in the calendar year preceding the survey are included in the
population. This excludes those individuals who only "worked without pay."
3. This conclusion is supported by a regression of the Cmi
coefficient on a constant and a time trend; after correcting for first-order
serially correlated errors, the estimate of the trend coefficient for the
earnings distribution was .00004, with standard error 0.00031. Including
the adult male unemployment rate on the right-hand side as a proxy for
business cycle effects, the estimate falls to -.0001,with standard error
the total family income distribution; without the unemployment rate the
estimated trend coefficient is .0013 (.0003), while controlling for the
cycle results in a coefficient estimate of .0005 (.0006).
4. For a discussion of the theory of household production, see Becker
(1981).
5.These statistics refer to the labor force activity in the calendar
year prior to the year in which marital status is measured.
6. Another important aspect of a researcher's analysis is the dataset
he uses. However, for the studies reviewed in this section, and for the
empirical work in this paper, either the March or the May Current Population
Surveys served as the primary source of data. Since the CPS does not differ
by month in its method of sampling, it is doubtful that much of the
differences in conclusions drawn by different studies are the result of
differences in the datasets analyzed.
7. A year-round worker is defined as an individual who was employed at
least 50 weeks in the previous year; a full-time worker is defined as an
individual who works at least 35 hours per week.
8. The sample used by Henle and Rsycavage for their wage and salary
distributions only includes wage and salary workers who are employed at the
time of the survey. These results are not discussed here.
9. Henle and Rsycavage also use the share of income received by the
bottom 10 percent, the top 10 percent, and the top five percent, in
50calculating their inequality measures. Gastwirth (1972) shows that there is
a problem in the Census Bureau's method of calculating Gini coefficients
from grouped data (mainly due to the fact that their method does not
incorporate information on the average level of income within the relevant
groupings) which, for most conventional income distributions, causes their
estimates to be biased upward (relative to the Cmi coefficient one would
calculate from individual-level data).
10. Prior to 1976, March CPS data contain information on weeks worked
in the previous year only in a coded interval form,e.g., one-to-fifteen
weeks, etc. Dooley and Gottschalk do not discuss how they construct a
weekly earnings variable from annual earnings and a coded weeks variable.
11. For more information on the Census Bureau's imputation procedure,
known as the "hot deck" method, see David, et. al., (1986).
12. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides "populationweights"
that account for both the sampling scheme used and the tendency of the CPS
to oversample certain demographic groups. The Census Bureau advises that
these weights be used in calculating populationaverages involving incomes.
None of the articles discussed in this section mention use of theweights
(though the grouped data used by Henle-Rsycavage were most likely computed
using a procedure that takes account of the weights.)
13. In a later study, Bluestone and Harrison (1986)compare the
earnings distributions among all workers in 1978 and 1984, and find that
most of the "job growth" over that six-year period occurred at the lower end
of the distribution. No evidence is presented on thesensitivity of this
result to Bluestone and Harrison's choice ofyears.
14. The fact that they find decreasing inequality for 1964-1978,a
period during which employment was also shifting to the service sector,
leads one to question why this explanation should be given suchimportance.
Indeed, iJrquhart (1984) shows that the shift from goods to servicesmay have
been more rapid from 1967 to 1972 than it was from 1977 to 1982.
15. Since the income cutoffs for the females depend on the male, not
the female, median level of earnings, part of the increase for females
reflects the rise of female-male wage ratios by 1983.
16. This conclusion is confirmed by McMahon and Tschetter (1986) who
show that whatever changes there were in the inequality ofweekly earnings
were due largely to changes within occupations, and not to employment shifts
toward occupations with relatively high and relatively lowaverage levels of
earnings.
17. Medoff excludes public-sector and agricultural employees, and
includes part-time workers.
18. However, in all six years analyzed, inequality in the
nonnianufacturing sector is substantially higher than in the manufacturing
sector.
5119. Actually, these two analyses still differ on two accounts: (1),
Harrison, et. al., analyze wage and salary income, while Plotnick uses all
earned income; and (2), Harrison, et. al., calculate the variance of
logarithms using individual-level data, while Plotnick uses grouped data.
20. Since the use of imputed incomes is assumed when the BLS computes
its weights (see note [12]), omitting observations with imputed incomes is
tantamount to changing the weights used in the analysis.
21. The lowest real value for the top-coded level of earnings occurs
in the March 1981 CPS (pertaining to income in 1980). The following year,
the nominal value of the top-code was raised to 75,000 dollars; in 1985 it
was raised to 99,999 dollars.
22. The mean logarithmic deviation, proposed by Theil (1967), is the
logarithm of the ratio of the arithmetic mean of income to the geometric
mean of income. These measures, and their properties, are discussed more
fully in Blackburn (1987).
23. The trend coefficients at the bottom of Table 3 are the estimated
values of b and b in the following equations:
1 2
1(t) =a+ b * + e (t) -trend
1 1 1
1(t) a2 + b2*t + c*IJ(t) + e2(t) -trendwithout
cycle
where 1(t) is the level of inequality in year t, and the error terms el(t)
and e2(t) are assumed to be normally distributed, and to follow an AR(l)
process. U(t) is the adult male unemployment rate in year t.
24. It also implies that there has not been an outward shift of the
Lorenz curve over time, which would occur if and only if there had been an
unambiguous increase in inequality (see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1973).
25. Our results are not directly comparable to those of Henle and
Rsycavage because we use individual, not grouped data, and because we use
consistent top-codes on earnings. However, the trend in our Cmi
coefficients mirrors the movements reported by Henle and Rsycavage for the
1967-1977 period. Our findings do not concur with those of Harrison, Tilly,
and Bluestone.
26. Blackburn shows that an increase in the covariance of education
and age among males and a rise in the return to schooling were also
important factors in this rise.
27. To the extent that hourly wage rates depend on the number of hours
supplied by workers, the distribution of wage rates is not completely purged
of labor supply influences.
5228. The industry employment shares in 1967 and 1984 were as follows:
Industry 1967 1984
Manufacturing 30.0 22.3
Other Goods 10.7 8.9




For a definition of the industry categories, see the footnote to
Table 6.
29. These results are consistent with those reported by Medoff, who
analyzed hourly wage rates using a manufacturing/non-manufacturing
breakdown.
30. The mean logarithmic deviations for the individual industries are
not presented here, although they exhibit patterns and trends that are
qualitatively similar to those presented for the Gini coefficient.
Unfortunately, the Gini coefficient does not possess the same decomposition
property as the mean logarithmic deviation.
31. Pechman provides evidence that tax rates have declined for thetop
decile of the income distribution, due to the decreasing importance of the
corporate income tax and the property tax. This finding strengthens our
conclusion that the upper part of the distribution has become increasingly
skewed over time.
32. Levy and Michel (1983) analyze the effects of tax system changes
on after-tax income inequality for the years 1981 to 1984 and find the tax
system to have changed so as to increase income inequality. However, unlike
Pechman, their analysis fails to include corporate income taxes. They also
do not explore the extent to which their results are sensitive to the
particular assumptions they make concerning the incidence of various taxes.
33. The principal earner is defined as the head of household for those
families in which this concept is not ambiguous, i.e., for families not
headed by a married couple. For married-couple families, thespouse with
the higher earnings is defined as the principal earner.
34. Before the 1980 CPS, the head of household was always an adult
male if there was one present in the household. After 1980, the designation
of head of household was made by the survey respondent.
5335. In 1985, the population of female unrelated individuals consisted
of more young, divorced females than it did in 1967 when a female living
alone was more likely to be older and widowed.
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